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Recreating Political Order: The Somali Systems Today
David K. Leonard 
Summary
The Somali pastoral system of production covers at least six political entities.
Three of the formal ones are within the borders of the former Republic of Somalia
and do not meet the full definition of states. Despite the warfare that has often
engulfed the former Somalia, it is a mistake to think of the three political entities
that occupy it as necessarily or wholly anarchic. Lineage institutions have survived
from the colonial era and been resurrected to provide venues for negotiation, 
consensus-building and the reduction of interpersonal violence, even if not the
authoritative imposition of decisions upon groups of the unwilling. After 17 years of
centrality to the continuity of Somali governance and the recreation of quasi-state
political authorities, however, these lineage institutions are showing signs of
stress. As their great influence came to be recognised they were penetrated by
patronage and used by warlords to prosecute sub-clan warfare. They no longer
are able to provide consensus representation even in the peaceful political 
systems of Somaliland and Puntland. Somalis therefore have experimented with
new political institutions that could provide a greater basis for cross-clan action
and authoritative decision-making – regional nationalism and democracy in
Somaliland and Islamic sheria in all the territories but especially by the now-
deposed (but far from dead) Union of Islamic Courts. Indeed sheria now is a 
central, unifying ideology throughout the Somalis, even if there is conflict over its
interpretation and the instrumentalities through which it will be enforced. Somali
governmental processes thus are present, but weak in their ability to impose 
decisions and to project their authority into the rural areas. There are public goods
that Somalis need which only states can provide. But the transformation of 
traditional order in the warlord conflicts of the last 17 years will make such states
difficult to create.
Keywords: Somalia; Somaliland; social contract; clan; sheria; statelessness.
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1 Introduction
The territories of the former Republic of Somalia have been subject to disorder
and uncertainty for over 15 years, leaving social scientists and actors alike 
scrambling for models to understand and predict what is happening. Outside
observers all too frequently bring to the Somalis not only Western expectations
about the functioning of state and society but Western philosophical baggage
about the state as well. It is surprising how often even journalists and aid workers
cite the seventeenth century proposition of Thomas Hobbes that without the state,
there is war ‘of every man against every man’ and life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’
(1651: Ch. 13). The current political systems of the Somalis provide us with an
unusual opportunity to re-explore the meaning of statelessness and social 
contracts and to rid ourselves of outmoded assumptions. 
2 The political systems of the 
former Republic of Somalia
At least six political entities contain citizens of Somali ethnicity – the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), Puntland (which nominally acknowledges
the TFG but effectively sets its own policies), Somaliland (whose claim of 
sovereignty has not been recognised internationally), Djibouti (which includes 
people of Afar as well as Somali ethnicity), Region V of Ethiopia (the ‘Somali
National Regional State’), and the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. In addition,
the Union of Islamic Courts, which was overthrown by Ethiopia on behalf of the
TFG, remains a significant contestant for sovereignty. Since Somali herders and
traders move constantly across the boundaries of these entities, there is 
significant economic and social continuity across these units, often making it 
useful to consider them collectively, not just discretely.1
In this paper we will focus on the political economy of the four political systems
that occupied the territory of the former Republic of Somalia in late 2006, but it will
place that analysis in the context of the larger set of states that govern the Somali
people. The paper is based on a month of fieldwork and on extensive consultation
of relevant publications and documents. Over 40 interviews were conducted. The
names of those interviewed are not given, as the political situation in the area
makes confidentiality essential. Unfortunately, at the time the field research was
undertaken the military conflict in the south of Somalia made it impossible for me
1 This paper grew out of research done in 2006 by me for the FAO and IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative. 
Of course the designations employed and the presentation of material in this article do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of either the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations or the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development concerning the legal status of 
any country, territory, city or area or its authorities concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or 
boundaries. Similarly, the opinions expressed in this article are solely my own and do not constitute in 
any way the position of the FAO, IGAD, the Livestock Policy Initiative nor the governments studied. I 
am grateful for comments made on an earlier draft by Mick Moore and Nelson Kasfir.
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to do work there and I was confined to Somaliland and Puntland. However, in the
1980s I had consulted in the Bay Region and Mogadishu, so I am not unfamiliar
with that area and I also interviewed Somalis in Nairobi who are active there.
Further, I was very fortunate to be able to draw on the publications of the War-torn
Societies Project International (WSP 2001, 2004, 2005) which are based on a
very extensive set of consultations it conducted in Puntland, Somaliland and to a
lesser extent elsewhere in the former Republic of Somalia.
Somalia has not met the standard text-book definition of statehood since
President Siad Barre fled the country in 1991 (Pérouse de Monclos 2001). Max
Weber defined a state as an organisation that is able to exercise a monopoly over
the legitimate exercise of force within defined territorial boundaries (1947: 156);
and over the last 17 years no claimant to the mantle of succession in the domain
of the Republic of Somalia has met those criteria. Instead the territory has been
dominated by fragmentation and conflict, largely based on allegiances to clans,
warlords and sometimes religion. Most of the country had been controlled by 
clan-affiliated warlords and their privately financed militias, who were backed by
individual big businessmen and fought one another for control of the places from
which they could extract economic rents (Lewis 2002). Somaliland, in the north-
west of what was Somalia, declared itself independent in 1991 (WSP 2005: 14),
has the organisational structure of a state in Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, and
Togdheer Regions but is still contesting sovereignty over Sool and Sanaag in its
east with Puntland and as yet has not been able to conduct elections there (see
WSP 2004: 22; FNs 39 and 96).2 In fact armed conflict over this contested 
territory broke out again in late 2007. Puntland is in the northeast and established
a weak governmental structure in 1998 (WSP 2001: 11). It has reasonable control
of Bari and Nugaal Regions but in late 2006 was fighting the Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC) to retain control of Galkayo and the territory to its south in Mudug. At
that time the UIC controlled Mogadishu and had expanded its control to the
coastal southern areas of the country, but it had yet to create an organisational
apparatus for state functions beyond its military and the Islamic courts. The
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed out of negotiations in Kenya
in 2004 (WSP 2004: 2) and Ethiopia displaced the UIC on its behalf in January
2007. Nominally the TFG holds the allegiance of all of the former Republic of
Somalia, save Somaliland. In practice it is little more than a group of former 
warlords and their delegates sitting as ministers. In late 2006 it controlled only the
territory around Baidoa (Baydhabo, Bay Region), and Puntland backed it. It now
has formal control of all the south but forces associated with the UIC and others
contest its authority, particularly in Mogadishu (Muqdisho) and Kismaayo (OCHA
2007).
It is unlikely that the particular victor in the grand geopolitical contest over 
sovereignty in the former Republic of Somalia matters very much for the welfare
of most Somali. Obviously peace would be hugely positive and in that sense it
matters whether or not the ‘grand game’ reaches a final, stable solution. As and
when stable state structures emerge to govern the Somalis, the transaction costs
2 FN designates the page number in the author’s field notes of confidential interviews.
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and risks of engaging in livestock trade, which is fundamental to Somali incomes,
will diminish quite significantly and the conditions for the small amount of Somali
crop production will improve (FN: 5, 13, 20, 33). All the contending entities offer
such a peace benefit, however.
Furthermore, most of the territories occupied by Somalis are arid or semi-arid.
Only in the area between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers in the south of Somalia
do they engage in substantial amounts of sedentary agriculture. The Somali 
livestock production system is overwhelmingly transhumant, with herders moving
their stock to access seasonal pastures and water points. Because the nature of
these resources varies from year to year, as does the need for them, and because
they are left unoccupied for substantial periods between uses, conflicts over
access to them are common and sometimes deadly. While a herder is away, lands
he is accustomed to using may be occupied by other herders or farmers and in a
bad year it may be a matter of life or death whether or not he is able to reclaim
them (Devereux 2006: 11, 15, 106–10). When it comes to stopping violent conflict
over water and grazing on the savannah, none of the contenders for power are
likely to be able to deliver dramatic changes, for neither the colonial powers in the
past nor Kenya in the present (whose ‘stateness’ is unquestioned) established an
effective monopoly of force in the pastoral hinterland.
It is true that the status of the ‘grand game’ at any given point does matter greatly
for diplomacy and for the security of many international actors. Here we will pass
over these macro-political matters, however, and focus instead on the issues of
governance at the domestic level that exist today and will persist into the future,
no matter who wins. What are the underlying social structures and the problems
facing daily life, production and trade? How has order been maintained, 
production pursued and trade conducted in this chaotic setting?
3 How is ‘everyday order’ created 
in ‘chaos’?
It is an error to conclude that just because the Republic of Somalia is no longer
functioning and because there are warlords and various types of factions in 
control of much of its territory, that anarchy therefore reigns. In industrialised
states there are very few governance institutions between the individual and the
state, so that in them the collapse of the state really does threaten anarchy. But in
Somalia the reach of the state was never complete and governance institutions
that pre-existed it have continued to persist or have been resurrected in the last
17 years. These ‘traditional’ institutions have been stressed by the persistence of
violent conflict in much of the territory the Somali people occupy. But they 
continue to provide a powerful frame for human behaviour. As Manor (2007: 3–15)
and his colleagues have found, even in fragile states surprising levels of 
constructive local potential survive conflict. Local institutions may be damaged by
conflict but they do better than national ones. No new state entity ever creates its
governing institutions from a tablula rasa; it must instead respond not only to 
patterns of individual interests but also to persisting structures of non-state 
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governance as well. If we are to understand the political economy of the present
and future political entities of the Somalis, these persistent structures must be 
presented, analysed and weighted.
Journalists often cite Thomas Hobbes in discussing Somalia. Hobbes assumed
that the universal (cross-cultural) and primary (coming before all others) motive of
human beings is personal survival. But this fundamental assumption of his 
analysis was philosophically, not empirically rooted. It was derived and modified
from the work of Grotius (Tuck 1989: 68–74). Rousseau, challenged the
Hobbesian axiom, by insisting that it was too individualistic (Rousseau 1992
[1755], 2001 [1762]; Wokler 2001: 54, 56, 74; O’Hagen 1999: 101). Rousseau 
followed Aristotle in asserting that sociability is fundamental to humanity as well,
that the generation of wealth requires collective, not just individual activity, and
that humans have a natural propensity for empathy toward others when it doesn’t
conflict with their direct self-interests. 
Evans-Pritchard’s monograph on the Nuer did provide colonial-era data on 
behaviour in a stateless society. Contrary to the Hobbesian expectation he did not
find a ‘war of all against all’. This classic piece of social anthropology concludes
that pervasive inter-group conflict among the Nuer is avoided through the 
negotiating prowess and religious authority of the ‘leopard skin chiefs’ (1940).
Robert Bates has provided a reinterpretation of the Evans-Pritchard data and
asserts that order instead is provided by the mutual deterrence of ‘tit-for-tat’
retaliatory behaviour by kinship groups (1983: Ch 1).
We also have the observations of I.M. Lewis in A Pastoral Democracy (1999
[1961]: 6, 28, 163, 168–70, 228–32) on statelessness among the Somali in 
colonial British Somaliland. His research doesn’t fit either Hobbes or Rousseau
perfectly: – the state probably does protect urban dwellers from violence better
than other forms of political organisation, but neither colonial nor contemporary
states in the Greater Horn of Africa have done an adequate job of protecting 
pastoralists in the savannah. In the absence of effective security from states,
Somalis have not engaged in a ‘war of all against all’ but instead have sought 
protection from kinship groups. Lewis’s findings are less optimistic than those of
Evans-Pritchard (even though he was taught by him), nor do they confirm Bates’
thesis about the universal efficacy of tit-for-tat retaliation as a solution to 
inter-group conflict. According to Lewis the payment of ‘blood money’ by Somali
dia-paying groups3 may prevent the escalation of conflict, when that is what most
of the segmentary lineage wants instead of revenge. But it doesn’t stop the 
existence of considerable inter-personal violence in the system nor the callous
disregard by dominant lineages of ‘blood money’ demands from weaker ones. 
We shortly will see that clan groups emerged as the building blocks for re-
negotiating civil order in Somaliland and Puntland. But we also will see, finally,
that as the power of clan groups was recognised they came to be subverted by
warlords and businessmen, thereby demanding a new level and form of 
organisation for creating security.
3 About which we will say more below.
People in the absence of the state and civil order do not seek to maximise their
personal chances of survival or of individual wealth. Childless young men, who
should be most self-interested, are the least cautious about their own lives and
seem to be highly oriented toward their immediate social groups in their fighting
and material accumulation strategies. Military sociologists have long told us that
soldiers do not risk their lives for God (an abstract ideology), country (another
social abstraction) or glory, but out of solidarity with, and to maintain the respect
of, their peers in their immediate fighting units. Similarly sociologists and 
anthropologists studying Africa tell us that people seek wealth, at least in the first
instance, in order to meet the social obligations to their kin that they accumulated
while growing up and that they subsequently use it to purchase status in their
communities (Marie 1997: 416; Berry 1993).
Thus wealth is not particularly valuable in its own right but instead is an 
instrument for extending, consolidating and gaining status within one’s social 
network. And survival, which certainly is highly valued, will often be put at risk for
the sake of this same network. Indeed, in most of the developing world and 
certainly in Africa, the kinship group and locality are not in conflict with personal
survival but are seen as the basic units through which it is achieved (Elias in
Marie 1997: 415).
The question, then, is what is the fundamental character of the social network to
which Somalis owe their allegiance under conditions of great stress. Are we 
looking at something like Richard Dawkins’s Selfish Gene (1976), in which human
behaviour at the extremes is designed to assure the survival and prosperity of
those most like ourselves genetically? Or do humans socially construct the groups
to which they pledge ‘their lives and their sacred honor’? The general evidence
tends toward ‘social construction’ of identity, but under conditions of considerable
stress, when survival is most threatened, the metaphor (although most often not
the strict substance) of the ‘selfish gene’ seems to be operative.
The large literature on race and ethnicity, not to speak of nationality, demonstrates
that these superficially ‘genetic’ identities are as much or more cultural than 
biological constructs. They are artificial creations and do not need to have even
an ostensible genetic root, as we can see in many forms of religious and other
ideological convictions (Fearon and Laitin 2000). On the other hand, as we have
witnessed the dramatic breakdown of social order in many places in the last 
century, it is striking that most often the ‘reversion’ unit for survival and coping is
the extended family or the neighbourhood. In Somalia the structures of intra- and
inter-clan governance had been seriously eroded by Italian colonialism (less so by
British) (Huiliaras 2002: 158). They seemed to survive largely as ‘socially 
constructed’ identities – real in their social consequences but for a great many
Somalis in the south of the country, lacking very much in social structure.
Nonetheless when the Somali state collapsed and people were threatened with
lives that were ‘nasty, brutish and short’ (as Hobbes would have it) the entire 
segmentary lineage system of clan governance sprung back into life and became
the fundamental organising principle for attempts at civil order.
The preceding thesis of reversion under great stress to the social Darwinian 
evolutionary principle of struggle to perpetuate the ‘gene pool’ must be qualified,
however. First, even a segmentary lineage system (one which builds units of 
11 
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loyalty outward from the nuclear family on the basis of degree of biological 
relationship) is socially constructed in Somalia, for it is based on only patrilineal
decent. Since Africa also has matrilineal descent systems (e.g., southern Ghana)
it is clear that this way of defining and qualifying lineage is a product of culture,
not just biology. The family as a motivating force thus seems to be more of a
metaphor (Lakoff 2002) and thus a socially constructed ideology for motivating
behaviour, with a powerful but only loose association with the instinct to protect
one’s kin. For example, Bernhard Helander asserts that a majority of the Hubeer
clan in the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia probably are members by 
adoption, not descent, but that this does not alter their adherence to the clan (in
Besteman and Cassanelli 1996: 50–1). 
4 Key Somali political actors
4.1 Clans 
The Somali segmentary lineage system is based on various breaks in the line of
male descent. Somalis can trace their patrilineal line for up to 30 generations. The
broadest lineage grouping is the clan family, which has symbolic and political 
significance but no organisation. One progresses to ever-smaller groupings – the
clan, the sub-clan, the sub-sub-clan and finally the dia-paying group. The last is
the subordinate and contractual part of the sub-sub-clan that handles claims for
and payment of compensation for injuries. I.M Lewis provides the classic and
authoritative description of the social functioning of these lineage groups in
Somalia and there is no need to reproduce his account here (1999 [1961]).
There is frequent reference to the ‘clan elders’ in Somali politics but the meaning
of the term varies by level. At the dia-paying level it simply denotes the collection
of adult male members. At clan level it designates an ugas, ‘sultan’, or other
hereditary, more-or-less honorary leader, who rarely plays a political role. In
between would be people, such as a nabadoon in the south or a beeldaajie in
Puntland, selected by the community to negotiate peace between lineage groups,
to administer customary law (xeer), and to preside over the assembly of elders.
Again, this type of role is facilitative rather than authoritative. Unless their standing
has been eroded by too partisan a role in politics, these positions usually have
enough influence to enforce judgements. But this is due to persuasion and 
legitimacy, not control of force (FN: 76).
Technically all adult males have the right of participation at any level of lineage
assembly. Beyond this level of ‘universal suffrage’, ‘clan elders’ is a loose term
connoting those who command respect in their communities and have been 
suggested to represent the lineage in some kind of representative function. They
need not reside in the community proper and might even be self-made 
businessmen or from the diaspora (FN: 76).
A system of governance organised around segmentary lineage provides a social
structure for negotiating relationships and social contracts (xeer) among groups,
(although it has its limits) (Brons 2001: 120; Farah and Lewis 1997: 353; WSP
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2005: 51). It can give relationships regularity and reduce violence by creating
structures of deterrence. Commerce does extraordinarily well, using the clan 
system and Islamic sheria courts with agility to build trust and enforceable 
contracts (even across clans) (FN: 33, 51). 
Furthermore, in Somaliland and then in Puntland the end of civil war and the 
creation of new constitutions were negotiated through clans. The clan elders in
the sense of representatives and conciliators (the guurti) are responsible for the
success of Somaliland today. They sold the idea of disarmament to the key clans
and negotiated the representation of other clans. They play a similar but lesser
role in Puntland. In circumstances in which it was very difficult and divisive to hold
elections, legislative representatives in both authorities were designated in clan
proceedings. The dominant lower house in Somaliland moved on in 2005 to 
representatives elected directly by the citizenry but in Puntland clan 
representation is still used (FN: 52, 77–8, 95).
As we contemplate the social contracts negotiated in the guurti by the clans in the
northern Somali polities, we should note that these are different from the ones
hypothesised by Hobbes (or even Rousseau). They were contracts among
groups, not individuals, and thus differ from the philosophical foundations of the
western liberal state (Lucy 2007: 20). This feature that order and the social 
contract is created by kinship or locality groups is shared by the Nuer (Evans-
Prichard 1940; Bates 1983) and may be general, then, to stateless societies.
Nonetheless, the clans are weak at imposing order, despite their importance,
especially on those who are willing to ignore or abuse the system. Among the
Somali all adult males participate in the base level of clan deliberations and 
decisions are made by consensus. Even where the clan structures are strong, as
in the north, north-east and Belet Weyne, it is difficult to impose burdens for the
collective good that do not command nearly universal consent. And, of course,
clan governance is a weak instrument for dealing with supra-clan problems. 
Especially in the south, as the political significance of clan institutions has become
clear, they have been penetrated by the patronage of warlords and big 
businessmen, thus harming their integrity and effectiveness. Thus the authority of
southern clan elders has been eroded by their being co-opted into partisan 
political combat (FN: 45, 78). Some believe that the clans were manipulated and
bought in the creation of the TFG, compromising the legitimacy of the latter. On
the southern coast clans were able to do no more than create truces between
warlords and have shown limited ability to resist either the warlords or the
Islamists.
In the north and northeast legislative representatives had been nominated from
the sub-sub clan, highly contested and then selected at a higher, senior elder
level. This is still true for Puntland and the TFG. In Somaliland the selection of
legislative representatives has moved from sub-clan consensus to citizen secret
ballot, and in doing so the coherence of the lineages has weakened. Individuals
from different parties represent the same clan in the lower house in Somaliland
elected in 2005. Although there certainly is an element of clan underlying political
allegiances, the parties in the legislature are mixed by clan, demonstrating that
the clans as bodies of collective decision-making now have diminished 
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significance (Abokor and Kibble 2006: 9–21; FN: 52–3, 77–8, 98). From this we
can conclude that clan elders can be highly effective at conciliation and at 
representation on issues that are not internally divisive, but that the effectiveness
of the institution breaks down if it is used for partisan competition or to impose
(rather than negotiate) settlements. Clan elders can help to negotiate consensus
on issues of common interest but they don’t act by majority rule and they can’t
impose a decision on an organised group.
4.2 Warlords
A variety of clans and parties were instrumental in the overthrow of Siad Barre in
1991. The militias they formed were not a unified force and once Barre had fled
they fell to fighting with one another for control of territory and revenues. The
most valuable terrain was and is that which contains the major ports, for the most
important tax revenues in Somalia always came from duties on imports and
exports. In addition those who controlled a port could determine who was able to
trade through it and gain commercial advantage in the markets it served. Thus
many of the warlords were financed by important businessmen (WSP 2004: 10).
Tragically, the material interests of the warlords and their business partners were
better served by the collection of ‘economic rents’ than by enhancing the 
productivity of the general population. In Somaliland the local military leaders in
the overthrow of Barre (even if they were clan-based) handed over rule to a 
civilian government after the Burao meeting of the region’s elders, intellectuals
and politicians in order to declare the secession of Somaliland from the Somali
Republic. In Puntland the warlords at least were able to gain enough control to
assure peace to those who inhabited and used their territory. But in the south and
particularly in Mogadishu, control and thus peace have been elusive. 
4.3 Rootless young soldiers
After a decade and a half of civil war it should come as no surprise that a 
substantial portion of Somali young men are engaged in paramilitary activities.
None of the Somali political systems are secure and stable enough to demobilise
the militias in which these men serve, and their upkeep consumes considerable
resources. Even in Somaliland, where the militias have been absorbed into a 
fairly disciplined army, over 70 per cent of all monies collected by the government
go to the ‘security services’ (FN: 93). If these young men are poorly paid, as they
have been in the TFG and Puntland, they may prove unreliable in combat or
spend their extra hours setting up rogue roadblocks to extract money from 
commercial vehicles for their daily qat (a mild stimulant). It is thought that one of
the reasons that the fighters for the Union of Islamic Courts were initially so 
effective and did not set-up roadblocks is that Middle East donors pay them 
substantially more than the forces of the other political actors in the region do
(FN: 6). One of the things that made the UIC very popular with traders, even
those in the north and northeast, was that it did not allow its soldiers to ‘tax’
livestock being moved to the ports. (Under the TFG a lorry moving up the south-
north spine road would face 30 roadblocks and a total tariff of about $1000.)
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These young men do not exert any direct influence on economic policy. But 
indirectly they raise the transaction costs of trade and eat up the various 
governmental budgets (even in Somaliland) which might otherwise go toward 
public goods.
Military predation and the inter-group warring that goes with it prompt one to
reflect on the history of state formation in Europe. A number of years ago Charles
Tilly (1992) suggested that in its early stages the state looked more like the 
protection rackets of organised crime than some great project for the social good
– peasant and merchant communities provided for their own social order and
‘state builders’ imposed themselves on these basic units in a manner that was 
frequently predatory and initially did not add much social value. Groups that had a
choice between communal autonomy and the ‘protection’ of a proto-state 
generally preferred the former (Magagna 1991). In Africa what people under 
disorder seem to want most is not that the warlords and their youth militias create
states but that they stop fighting over the top of them, cease predating on their
commerce, and leave them alone to lineage and religious systems of order.
4.4 Traders
Hobbes felt that the state was a prerequisite to the creation of property and wealth
(1651: Ch 13). Rousseau (1755, 1762) hypothesised instead that states were
formed in order to protect wealth and inequality (e.g., Wokler 2001: 51). Although
most social theory has sided with Hobbes in seeing civil order as a prerequisite to
capitalist growth (North 1990), the experience of the Somalis has been closer to
Rousseau’s expectation. As the state collapsed Somali businessmen exploded
into extraordinary income-seeking efforts. The general populace has been 
impoverished by the conflicts of the warlords, but certain types of big 
businessmen have prospered from the removal of state controls on their 
endeavours. If the states in Somalia are an outgrowth of ‘organised crime’ (a la
Tilly), it is the big businessmen who are financing the predatory efforts of the 
warlords. Both may be preying on society; in any case we don’t see warlords
being terribly effective in taking advantage of rich traders. Of course, the extreme
laissez-faire environment of Somalia probably made some forms of capitalist
expansion easy at the expense of others. Those that have done best are those
who engage in various forms of export and import trade, turning the whole country
into a kind of duty-free port. Business growth also may have been facilitated by
the ability to ‘park’ capital in other, secure states, and has reached its limits now.
(Parking is achieved literally by Daallo Airlines, a very successful, Somali owned,
private enterprise, which keeps its planes in the Saudi peninsula.) Thus 
investments in fixed assets and production in Somalia proper are uncommon
(save for mobile phone towers) (Nenova and Harford 2004; Grosse-Ketler 2004).
Even in the livestock trade, the sanitary standards now being imposed by the Gulf
states require collective action among traders that will be difficult to accomplish
without more effective states (FN: 32). Nonetheless, any simple assumption that
statelessness is ‘bad for business’ cannot be sustained from the Somali evidence.
The strongest set of economic interests visible in most of the Somali polities are
those associated with commerce. At the most basic level ‘traders’ represents the
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collection of people who perform a trading function in Somali society. This
includes people who have little or no capital of their own and act as agents or
guarantors (jeeble and dilaal) for those who do international trading in livestock.
Then there are those who trade for themselves in local markets (Peter Little in
Besteman and Cassanelli 1996: 101–5). But our interest here is in those who
engage in export and import trade internationally. Freed from the regulatory
repression of the Barre regime, Somali business has undergone explosive growth,
so that Somalis are the dominant traders in the region and control major finance
and transport systems as well. Far from being at the mercy of the warlords in the
disintegrated Somali state, they have frequently emerged as their patrons. Politics
within the Somali political systems is heavily influenced by these individuals, who
are able to use their resources to purchase protection, personal consideration,
elected offices, and policy attention. Their hand could be seen in the debates
about the new Veterinary Code in Somaliland and they control the port of Bosasso
(Boosasso) (FN: 50, 57, 87). On the other hand, traders are not a unified block –
they compete intensely with each other, and as international markets shift and
reward different sets of personal connections, new traders become dominant. This
is seen most dramatically in the reversals in fortune between livestock traders with
the shifts in access to the Saudi market (FN: 85). Although Somali trade did
extremely well when freed of the regulation and economic repression of Barre, it
seems now to have reached the limits of what pure laissez-faire can deliver (if
laisser-faire also includes the unregulated purchase of war-lord power). There are
a number of areas, particularly in livestock exports, where public goods in the
form of internationally-recognised disease control and inspection are needed for
the next stages in economic development, and traders do not find it easy to
enforce collective action on one another without some kind of state-like authority.
Even the proto-state political systems of Puntland and Somaliland have a difficult
time when they do attempt to enforce regulations on this group. The strongest
pressures on them to do so are coming from the competition of another Somali
system – Djibouti – which now has a livestock inspection system that the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (with its vastly profitable market for goats for the haj) now 
recognises (Brass 2008). 
Extreme inequalities of wealth pose large challenges to the ability of extended
family/ community systems to define and defend their ‘general will’, as expressed
through the consensus of the assembly of adult males. Of course, inequality is a
basic feature of pastoral societies, but this wealth is expressed in cattle, the 
holdings of which vary considerably over an individual’s life. The current patterns
of inequality are not rooted in livestock production and are much greater. They
can stimulate predation – not on the wealthy, who can hire others to defend them
– but on the ability of people at the bottom to identify and pursue their common
interests, distorted as they come to be by patron-client relations. The wealthy can
provide jobs, handouts, and discrete benefits to individuals or small groups, 
thereby using patronage to command their support and leading them to sacrifice
their collective interests (such as higher prices or peace) for the sake of 
(ultimately less valuable) private ones (Bates 1981; Leonard 2006; Migdal 1974).
Thus the political actions of this trader group and of the Somali diaspora 
politicians are well described by a patron-client model of politics (Leonard 2006).
Of course the longer a conflict persists, the more likely it is that the businesses
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that are damaged by it will fail and will no longer have the resources to press their
interests very effectively. The corollary is that businesses that do well in a conflict
environment will grow in strength and, the longer it persists, will be likely exert an
influence that makes the resolution of the conflict more difficult.
4.5 Diaspora
Another group that persistent conflict has led to distort the structure of clan 
governance is the Somali diaspora. Given the instability and insecurity of life in
Somalia proper over the last 17 years, large numbers of Somalis have spread out
over the globe seeking economic opportunity and safety. The remittances 
provided by this diaspora are critical to the welfare of a very large number of
Somali families (Medani 2003). In addition, the economic and intellectual 
leadership of this group play surprisingly large roles in Somali politics. Over half
the cabinet ministers in the various Somali governments are from the diaspora
and hold double passports. Approximately half the elected members of the
Somaliland lower house are highly educated and rich individuals from the 
diaspora (FN: 52). The fact that these individuals are chosen to represent their
clans is a sign of the respect in which they are held by those left behind, but it
also often is a consequence of the resources they have contributed in the past or
are expected to bring in the future to their communities. The dynamics here too
are of a patron-client variety. Unlike the traders, diaspora leaders may not have
self-regarding or even mutually-consistent agendas, but their policy positions can
be independent of anything the electors or average clan elders expected in 
selecting them. As a group they are not tied to the interests of their constituents,
which generally lie in herding. But it also is true that only some of them are
traders, so they act as a counterweight to that group and to the warlords. They
are a weighty but ultimately unpredictable element in livestock policy, for example.
4.6 Islam
With the inability of the clans to bring peace to the south of Somalia, in 2006 we
saw the emergence of a new form of Islam in the form of the Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC) that made a very powerful ideological claim on society. The UIC had
the ability to impose greater order than any secular social structure seemed able
to create and was easily the most important instance of state-creation in the 
centre and south of the country since the fall of Barre. Sociologists of religion
have suggested that when death seems to become random and without regular
cause, people have a strong need for spiritual beliefs and practices that will
explain the inexplicable and give them some psychological tools for controlling the
uncontrollable. Thus religious systems of order may be a natural part of the deep
structure whereby people seek to bring environments of extreme danger under
control and to create extra incentives for sociable behaviour. 
Religion and other ideologies serve to reinforce social behaviour that considers
entities beyond the extended family. The nature and boundaries of that social
behaviour are defined by the particular, socially constructed ideology used. We
must assume that the incentives generated by these ideologies may be less 
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powerful than those of the extended family but are strong enough that they must
be considered in models of human behaviour. Among the Somali, kinship is the
first and foremost focus of socialisation, but Islam comes close behind and has
the virtue, at least as much as language, of being a historical unifying force for
them.4
With the weakening if not disintegration of state courts in some parts of the former
Republic, Somalis have turned to sheria ones, as they always did for family law
matters in any case. Together with the clans, these religious courts have provided
an important element of order and through the enforcement of contracts have
facilitated business, not only within the former Republic of Somalia but throughout
the Muslim world. These courts were a natural rallying force as disdain for the
warlords and disappointment at the stalled progress of the TFG grew. What made
the UIC controversial, therefore, (even in Somaliland and Puntland, where it never
prevailed) was not sheria itself but the questions of which interpretation of sheria
(WSP 2004: 7; WSP 2001: 68) and who lies behind it. Sheria courts are the 
primary form of adjudication in all the Somali polities, even in the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) which was reinstalled when the Ethiopians overthrew
the Islamist UIC.
Much of the UIC’s finances are thought to have come from Wahabi funda-
mentalists and an important minority within the movement was allied with 
al-Qaeda. At the leadership level it still seemed unclear in 2006 as to who would
hold the real reins of power, obviously a question of great importance to the
Americans and Ethiopians (ICG 2005). Somalis, particularly rural ones, are largely
Sufis, however, a form of Islam held in disdain by Wahabis. The question of
whether under the UIC the sheria courts would become fundamentalist or would
remain traditional and more tolerant therefore seemed open to many observers in
at that time.5 In addition, the UIC had been successful in gaining control only of
territories in which the Hawiye clan family is predominant. The president of
Puntland argued to his people that the UIC was part of a Hawiye plot to take over
Somalia (FN: 23). So whether or not clan issues would have merged with Islamist
ones and how this would have affected the political future of the Somalis is
unknown. Obviously the TFG and its Ethiopian and American allies became 
persuaded that the fundamentalists and those allied with al-Qaeda were 
predominant, leading them to unite in a military operation to overthrow the UIC.
This decision has thrown Mogadishu (and occasionally Kismayu) into civil war
again.
It is plausible that the emergence of Islam as a major factor in Somali regime 
politics is a direct consequence of the transformation of internal clan governance
during 15 years of conflict. The clan councils (shirs and guurti) are no longer 
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4 There are two dialects of Somali: Sab and Saawale, but the most persistent focus of resistance to 
colonialism was Islam (Lewis 2002: 13–14, Ch IV). 
5 It is highly likely that the overthrow of the UIC and its re-emergence as an insurgency against the TFG
has greatly strengthened the radicals within the movement and weakened the moderates. If, as we 
suspect may be the case, the UIC eventually prevails against the TFG, the Ethiopians and the US 
therefore will have achieved exactly the opposite outcome to the one they intended.
egalitarian structures. As those with political, military and economic power have
recognised the important role that clans are playing in mobilising people, resolving
disputes, and brokering the emergence of new regime, they have moved in on
them and transformed them into patron-client systems. This means that what was
once a system for the aggregation of the ‘general will’ is now instead an 
instrument of the particular interests of patrons. The warlords and major patrons
then are brought together into negotiated structures like the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) only by offers to advance those particular interests, which
leaves them without the stability and staying power that an endorsement by an
egalitarian clan structure would have provided. Islam then enters as the only other
force in Somali society that can cause warlords and patrons to honor their 
commitments, look to the long run, and serve some kind of ‘general interest.’
5 Creating order and states
The Somali experience restructures much of what we thought we knew about the
absence of states. Statelessness does not automatically mean disorder. The
extended family (or the locality), not anarchy, is the alternative to the state. 
Consistent with the expectations of Hobbes (and Rousseau), humans do use 
contract to find order in the face of conflict. Nonetheless, the social contract made
in these circumstances is forged by groups, not by other-regarding individuals,
and therefore provides a different kind of philosophical foundation than that 
provided by the social contract theorists for the Western liberal state. These
groups operate more by consensus than either hierarchy or democracy.
Nor is statelessness necessarily completely bad for business. Some economic
interests prosper in these conditions. The foundation for average Somali livelihood
is pastoral livestock production. As we noted at the outset, there are seven Somali
polities (if we include the insurgent UIC) and Somali herdsmen and traders 
constantly move across their boundaries in search of pastures and markets.
Sheep and goats move out of the Somali region of Ethiopia through Djibouti,
Bosasso (Boosaaso) in Puntland, and Berbera in Somaliland to markets 
throughout the Middle East, as they always have. In return duty-free products
from Dubai, Oman, etc. move back the other way through the same Somali ports
and trade routes. Somali cattle from north-eastern Kenya and southern Somalia
used to go out of Mogadishu and Kismayu to these same Middle Eastern markets,
but the urban demand of Nairobi, Kenya is now such that they mostly move there
instead. Even so duty-free goods are still flowing through the Somalia ports and
sustaining the wealth of its traders. 
Much of this herding and trade was never adequately governed by states, even in
the colonial era. Thus the fact that Somali clans, dia-paying groups, and Islamic
sheria courts are maintaining some degree of order and facilitating and enforcing
contracts is not new. The role of these other institutions has expanded, however,
and adapted to the much greater instability that now plagues the Somali people.
Sometimes traders now turn to sheria courts in the Saudi peninsula to arbitrate
their business disputes. And we have seen that the great wealth of the traders
who finance warlords in order to gain control over key ports and the lesser wealth
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of the many successful Somalis in the diaspora has shifted the formerly 
egalitarian dynamic of sub-clan institutions into patron-client ones instead. It may
surprise some to see patron-client relations dominating politics even in non-state
systems, but patronage really depends only on inequalities in the distribution of
life-sustaining resources and the need of elites for some kind of support from the
less-advantaged in return. 
In some ways, the Somali polities with sea ports resemble the city-states of the
Italian renaissance. But their authority is more fragile and life in them is more 
violent. These polities find it difficult to enforce policies in the common-good
against the interests of individual members of the economic elite. This has made it
very difficult to develop disease control and inspection systems that give Somali
livestock secure access to Middle Eastern markets (Leonard 2008).
In addition those elites who have built militias fight one another to monopolise key
resources – in Somalia most often the ports and the highways that transport 
livestock to them. The violent conflict that ensues is largely between the 
contestants for these monopoly powers – not against citizens – but the predation
that is necessary to support these militias and that follows from the establishment
of monopoly can be a substantial burden to any who generate income. (The latter
is exemplified by the cumulative $1,000 collected at road blocks from cattle trucks
on the road running along the western border of Somalia to the northern ports.)
Thus states do have benefities to offer to the Somalis.
The longer statelessness persists, however, the stronger and more influential the
interests that benefits from it become. Most producers and traders benefit from
the kinds of peace a state can provide, but those interests wane in strength and
influence as conflict endures and those activities produce less income. 
Under extreme stress the effectiveness even of kinship units of survival will erode
and be subject to the allied manipulations of the force of warlords and the 
patronage of big businessmen. It then may become difficult to mobilise either 
individual or kinship interests on behalf of state forms of social order. When the
politics of greed no longer is tolerable and the limits of the politics of kinship
become evident, society is fertile soil for the implantation of ideologies that can
promise civil order. In the case of Somaliland, those ideologies were a new 
nationalist identification with the polity forged under British colonialism, followed
by democracy. For the south of the former Republic of Somalia, the only ideology
that proved able to rise above narrow sub-clan loyalties was Islam and its sheria
courts. The Union of Islamic Courts did seem able to deliver peace and increased
order to a troubled land after 15 years of struggle between warlords. For better or
worse the Somalis see the Ethiopian rescue of the Transitional Federal
Government as a challenge to Islam from a predominately Christian power, 
thereby merging the potent forces of religion and nationalism. In the modern world
it is hard to imagine any other forces out of which a state could be indigenously
developed.
IDS WORKING PAPER 316
20
References
Abokor, A.Y. and Kibble, S. (2006) Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland
Parliamentary Elections September 2005, London: Progressio
Bates, R.H. (1983) Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
—— (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of
Agricultural Policies, Berkeley: University of California Press
Berry, S. (1993) No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian
Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
Besteman, C.and Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) (1996) The Struggle for Land in Southern
Somalia, London: Westview Press
Brass, J.N. (2008) The Political Economy of Livestock Policy: The Case of
Djibouti, Addis Ababa and Djibouti: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Livestock Policy Initiative
Brons, Maria (2001) Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From
Statelessness to Statelessness?, Utrecht: International Books
Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Devereux, S. (2006) Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia, IDS
Research Report 57, Brighton: IDS
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1940) The Nuer, Oxford: The Clarendon Press
Farah, A. and Lewis, I.M. (1997) ‘Making Peace in Somaliland’, Cashier d’Etudes
Africaines 146
Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. (2000) ‘Violence and the Social Construction of
Ethnic Identity’, International Organization 54.4: 845–77
Grosse-Kettler, S. (2004) External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War Economy
and Its Promoters, Paper 39, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion
Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathian, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a
Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, London: Andrew Crooke
Huliaras, A. (2002) ‘The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional
Geopolitics’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20.2
International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005) ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing
Hearts and Minds?’, Africa Report 95, Brussels: International Crisis Group
Lakoff, G. (2002) Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, 2nd 
edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Leonard, D.K. (2008) The Political Economy of Livestock Policy Among the
Somalis, Addis Ababa and Djibouti: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Livestock Policy Initiative
IDS WORKING PAPER 316
21
—— (2006) The Political Economy of International Development and Pro-Poor
Livestock Policies: A Comparative Assessment: Revised and Expanded, Pro-Poor
Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper 35, Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization
Lewis, I.M. (2002) A Modern History of the Somali Nation and State in the Horn of
Africa, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press
—— (1999 [1961]) A Pastoral Democracy, Oxford, Muenster-Hamburg: James
Curry Publishers, International African Institute
Lucy, Benjamin (2007) ‘Building Post-Conflict Democracy: The Case of
Somaliland’, unpublished MA Governance Paper, Brighton: IDS
Magagna, V. (1991) Communities of Grain: Rural Rebellion in Comparative
Perspective, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Manor, J. (ed.) (2007) Aid That Works: Successful Development Strategies in
Fragile States, Washington, DC: The World Bank
Marie, A, (ed.) (1997) L’Afrique des Individus, Paris: Editions Karthala
Medani, K. (2003) ‘Globalization, Informal Markets and Collective Action: The
Development of Islamic and Ethnic Politics in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia’, PhD
dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
Migdal, J. (1974) Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political
and Social Change in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Nenova, T. and Harford, T. (2004) Anarchy and Invention, Public Policy for the
Private Sector 280, November, Washington DC: The World Bank
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,
New York: Cambridge University Press
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Somalia (2007)
Situation Report 38, 4 May, Nairobi: OCHA – Somalia
O’Hagen, T. (1999) Rousseau, London: Routledge
Pérouse de Montclos, M.A. (2001) Interprétations d’un Conflit: Le Cas de la
Somalie, Pessac, France: Centre d’étude d’Afrique Noire, Université Montesquieu-
Bordeaux
Rousseau, J-J. (2001 [1762]) Du Contract Social, presentation par Bruno
Bernardi, Paris: Flammarion
_____ (1992 [1755]) Discours sur l’origine et les Fondements de l’inegalite Parmi
des Homes, Paris: Livres de Poche
Tilly, C. (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992, revised 
edition Cambridge MA: Blackwell
Tuck, R. (1989) Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
IDS WORKING PAPER 316
22
War-torn Societies Project International Somali Programme (WSP) (2005)
Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities, Lawrenceville, NJ and Asmara,
Eritrea: The Red Sea Press and WSP International
—— (2004) Dialogue for Peace: ‘Wada-tashiga Nabadda’, National Project Group
Meeting, Geneva and Nairobi: WSP International
—— (2001) Rebuilding Somalia: Issues and Possibilities for Puntland, London:
HAAN Associates and WSP International
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by
A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe
Wokler, R. (2001) Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
IDS WORKING PAPER 316
23
